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h i g h l i g h t s
• A principal assigns a task to one of two agents depending on future states.
• If the agents have concave utility, a state-dependent task assignment is optimal.
• If the agents are loss averse, a state-independent assignment can be optimal.
• In addition, the optimal contract may specify the same effort levels in all states.
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a b s t r a c t
We analyze a task-assignment model in which a principal assigns a task to one of two agents depending
on future states. If the agents have concave utility, the principal assigns the task to them contingent on
the state. We show that if the agents are loss averse, a state-independent assignment – assigning the task
to a single agent in all states – can be optimal even when the principal can write a contingent contract at
no cost.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.h1. Introduction
Assigning a task to an appropriate employee is a major deter-
minant of firm performance. Such a task assignment can be even
more important when the task requires a different skill depend-
ing on the situation. According to contract theory, in the absence
of asymmetric-information problem, a principal (she) offers a con-
tingent contract where she assigns a task to an agent (he) whose
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ments, however, a task is often assigned to a single agent regard-
less of the situation even if such a contingent contract is available.
We investigate this issue by incorporating a prominent behav-
ioral aspect, loss aversion: people are more sensitive to losses than
to same-sized gains. In our model, the principal assigns a task to
one of two agents in each state. Each agent’s productivity level
varies across states, whereas his effort-cost function is the same
across states. The principal writes a contract that specifies the
wages of the agents, which agent works on the task, and his ef-
fort level depending on the state. The agents are expectation-based
loss averse à la Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007): the utility of each
agent depends not only on intrinsic material payoffs but also on
psychological gain–loss payoffs from comparing his realized out-
come with his expected outcomes.
ts reserved.
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ways assigns the task to the agent with the highest productivity.
In contrast, if agents are loss averse, then the principal may assign
the task to a single agent in all states based on the trade-off be-
tween improving productivity and alleviating expected losses. On
the one hand, such a contract is less efficient in terms of produc-
tivity because a less productive agent works in some state. On the
other hand, it reduces the principal’s wage payment by alleviating
the expected losses of the agent. If the latter effect outweighs the
former, assigning the task to a single agent in all states becomes
optimal. In addition, when the degree of loss aversion is large, the
optimal contract specifies the same effort levels in all states. This
result is in sharp contrast with the standard concave-utility case
where the principal specifies state-specific effort levels as long as
the productivities of the agents are different.1
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up
the model. Section 3 analyzes the model. Section 4 concludes.
2. The model
2.1. Setup
Suppose one risk- and loss-neutral principal assigns a task to
one of two agents. All of them are uncertain about the future state
at the contracting stage. There are two states, s = 1, 2, and one
of the states is realized after contracting. State 1 (resp. state 2) is
realized with probability q ∈ (0, 1) (resp. 1 − q). The value of the
task depends on the state and the principal can write a contract
contingent on the state. Agent i = A, B works on the task if and
only if the principal assigns the task to him, and only one agent can
work on the task in each state. The agent in charge of the task exerts
effort e ∈ R+ with effort cost c(e) = e2/2. If agent A (resp. agent B)
is assigned to the task in state s ∈ {1, 2} and exerts effort eAs (resp.
eBs ), the principal earns αse
A
s (resp. βse
B
s ) from the task. Assume that
α1 > β1 and α2 < β2: the productivity of agent A is higher (resp.
lower) than that of agent B in state 1 (resp. state 2). For brevity, we
further assume thatβ1 = β2 = 1 and qα1+(1−q)α2 > 1: agentB’s
productivity is constant across states and the average productivity
of agent A is higher than that of agent B.2
Since our focus is not on moral hazard issues, we consider
a case in which the effort level is contractible in each state.3 The
principal offers a contract that specifies a wage scheme to each
agent depending on the state w = (wA1, wA2, wB1, wB2), the effort
level in each state e = (e1, e2), and which agent works on the task
contingent on the state.4 The states in which agent Aworks on the
task are denoted by D ∈ D ≡ {∅, {1}, {2}, {1, 2}}. For example,
D = {1}means agent Aworks in state 1 but agent Bworks in state
2. The contract is denoted by C(w, e;D) ∈ R4×R2+×D. Each agent
accepts the contract if his expected utility is larger than or equal to
his reservation utility, which is assumed to be zero. We call a task
assignment state-independent if the principal assigns the task to a
single agent in both states; otherwise we call it state-dependent.
The timing is as follows:
1. The principal offers a contract to agents.
2. Each agent chooses whether to accept the contract.
3. The state is realized.
4. The task assignment, the effort provision, and the payment are
carried out according to the contract.
1 As related literature, Heidhues and Kőszegi (2005, 2008) and Herweg and
Mierendorff (2013) analyze the optimality of state-independent pricing under
consumer loss aversion.
2 Our main results hold without imposing these specifications. See Daido et al.
(2013) for general analysis.
3 See, for example, Gill and Stone (2010) and Herweg et al. (2010) for analysis on
moral-hazard problems under agent loss aversion.
4 Note that in each state an agent who is not in charge of the task exerts zero
effort.2.2. Reference-dependent preferences
A key assumption of our model is that each agent’s overall
utility comprises intrinsic consumption payoffs and psychologi-
cal gain–loss payoffs. We assume that each agent has expectation-
based reference-dependent preferences à la Kőszegi and Rabin
(2006, 2007). In our model, the agents have two consumption di-
mensions: wage and effort. For each consumption dimension, they
feel a psychological gain or loss by comparing a realized outcome
with a reference outcome. For deterministic reference points, we
denote each agent’s reference point for his wage and effort cost by
wˆ and eˆ, respectively. If his actual wage and effort arew and e, then
his overall utility is given by:
w − c(e)+ µ(w − wˆ)+ µ(−c(e)+ c(eˆ)),
where µ(·) is a gain–loss function that corresponds to Kahneman
and Tversky’s (1979) value function. We assume thatµ(·) is piece-
wise linear to focus on the effect of loss aversion. Then, we can sim-
ply define the gain–loss function when consumption is x and the
reference point is r as
µ(x− r) =

x− r if x− r ≥ 0,
λ(x− r) if x− r < 0,
where λ ≥ 1 represents the degree of loss aversion.5 The agent is
loss neutral when λ = 1.
Following Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), we assume that
the reference point is determined by rational beliefs on outcomes
and that the reference point itself is stochastic if the outcome is
stochastic. Each agent feels a gain–loss by comparing every possi-
ble outcomewith every reference point. For example, suppose that
the principal assigns the task to agent i in s = 1 but not in s = 2
with paying a constant wage wi. Then, agent i expects to incur ef-
fort cost c(e1)with probability q and not to incur itwith probability
1 − q. If s = 1 is realized, then agent i incurs c(e1) and hence he
feels no gain–loss with probability q and feels a loss by c(e1) with
probability 1−q. If s = 2 is realized, then agent i does not incur the
effort cost and hence he feels a gain by c(e1)with probability q and
feels no gain–loss with probability 1 − q. Ex-ante the agent cor-
rectly anticipates all the above cases, and his expected gain–loss
utility in the effort dimension is −q(1 − q)(λ − 1)c(e1). The ex-
pected gain–loss utility in the wage dimension is zero because the
agent anticipateswi and actually receives it.
We derive the optimal contract based on the choice-acclimating
personal equilibrium (CPE) defined by Kőszegi and Rabin (2007).
Intuitively, each agent knows that his beliefs will be adapted
to his accepted contract before he actually chooses his action,
and hence he takes this change into account when accepting
a contract. Formally, given C(w, e;D) let 1is be the indicator
function that takes a value of one if agent i incurs an effort cost
in state s and takes zero otherwise. Because agent i’s accepted
contract itself determines his reference points, the condition
for accepting a contract C(w, e;D) under CPE is represented by
U i(w, e;D|w, e;D) ≥ 0, or equivalently,
qwi1 + (1− q)wi2 − 1i1qc(e1)− 1i2(1− q)c(e2)  
intrinsic utility
− q(1− q)(λ− 1) |wi1 − wi2| + |1i1c(e1)− 1i2c(e2)|  
gain–loss utility
≥ 0. (CPE-IR)
5 We set theweight of the gain–loss payoffs in Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), η,
equal to one. Under the solution concept of this paper, η can be normalized to one
without loss of generality.
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to accept the contract and actually does so is no less than when he
expected to decline the contract and actually does so.
3. Analysis
3.1. The optimal contract under concave utility
First, as a benchmark we study a case in which agents have
concave utility and are not loss averse. Suppose the agents have
concave utility for wages which is separable from the effort cost:
u(w)− c(e). Let u(·) be strictly increasing, concave, and u(0) = 0.
Note that in the optimal contract Condition (CPE-IR) holds with
equality. The principal offers a constant wage to each agent due
to the concavity of u(·). Because the principal’s maximization
problem is state-separable, she assigns the task to the agent with
the highest productivity in each state. These considerations lead to
the following result:
Result 1. Suppose agents have concave utility and are loss neu-
tral. Then, the state-dependent contract C(w¯, e¯; {1}) where w¯A1 =
w¯A2 = u−1(qc(e¯1)), w¯B1 = w¯B2 = u−1((1− q)c(e¯2)), e¯1 = argmaxe1
qα1e1 − u−1(qc(e1)), and e¯2 = argmaxe2(1 − q)e2 − u−1((1 − q)
c(e2)) is optimal.
Because an agentwhoworks on the task is determined tomaximize
the social surplus in each state, state-independent contracts are
never optimal when agents are not loss averse.6 Further, the effort
levels specified in the optimal contract vary across states because
the agents’ productivity levels depend on the state; even if agent
Awere to work on the task in both states, the principal would still
specify state-specific effort levels.
3.2. The optimal contract under loss aversion
Next, we examine the case where agents are loss averse. Since
the agents are loss averse to wage uncertainty, we can show that
each agent obtains a constant wage across states in the optimal
contract. We denote the constant wage by wis = wi. In addition,
given our setting it is straightforward to show that contracts with
D = {∅} andD = {2} are strictly dominated under any parameters.
Hence, we restrict the attention to contracts with D = {1} and
D = {1, 2}.7
Given a task-assignment schemeD, the expected utility of agent
A if he accepts contract C(w, e;D) becomes
UA(w, e; {1}|w, e; {1}) = wA − qe
2
1
2
− q(1− q)(λ− 1) e
2
1
2
,
UA(w, e; {1, 2}|w, e; {1, 2}) = wA − qe
2
1
2
− (1− q) e
2
2
2
− q(1− q)(λ− 1) |e
2
1 − e22|
2
.
The expected utility of agent B can be described in the same
manner. Note that Condition (CPE-IR) holds with equality in the
optimal contract. We denote the optimal wage by w∗(D) with
abbreviating the notations tow∗({1}) = w∗1 andw∗({1, 2}) = w∗12.
By substituting each optimal wage, the principal’s payoff function
6 Note that a state-dependent task assignment, D = {1}, is optimal even when
agents have concave consumption utility with a unitary consumption dimension:
u(w−c(e)). In this case, however, the optimal wages are not constant across states;
each agent obtains a positive wage if and only if he actually works on the task.
7 See Daido et al. (2013) for a detailed derivation.in each task-assignment scheme is represented by
π(w∗1, e; {1}) = qα1e1 + (1− q)e2 − q
e21
2
− (1− q) e
2
2
2
− q(1− q)(λ− 1) e
2
1
2
− q(1− q)(λ− 1) e
2
2
2
,
π(w∗12, e; {1, 2}) = qα1e1 + (1− q)α2e2 − q
e21
2
− (1− q) e
2
2
2
− q(1− q)(λ− 1) |e
2
1 − e22|
2
.
By solving the principal’s problem in each case, we derive the
optimal effort levels:
Lemma 1. Suppose agents are loss averse. Let λ¯ = α1+q(α1−α2)
α2+q(α1−α2) .
(i) Given D = {1, 2}, if λ < λ¯ the optimal effort levels are α2 <
e∗2(w
∗
12) < e
∗
1(w
∗
12) < α1 where e
∗
1(w
∗
12) = α11+(1−q)(λ−1) and
e∗2(w
∗
12) = α21−q(λ−1) ; if λ ≥ λ¯ the optimal effort levels are
e∗1(w
∗
12) = e∗2(w∗12) = qα1 + (1− q)α2.
(ii) Given D = {1}, the optimal effort levels are e∗1(w∗1) =
α1
1+(1−q)(λ−1) < α1 and e
∗
2(w
∗
1) = 11+q(λ−1) < 1.
Proof. (i) It is straightforward to show that e1(w∗12) < e2(w
∗
12)
is never optimal. Suppose e1(w∗12) ≥ e2(w∗12). If λ ≥ 1 + 1q ,
then the principal’s payoff is increasing in e2; hence e∗1(w
∗
12) =
e∗2(w
∗
12) = qα1+ (1− q)α2. If λ < 1+ 1q , the first-order conditions
yield e1(w∗12) = α11+(1−q)(λ−1) and e2(w∗12) = α21−q(λ−1) . Note that
α1
1+(1−q)(λ−1) >
α2
1−q(λ−1) if and only if λ < λ¯. Because 1+ 1q−λ¯ > 0,
the principal specifies the same effort levels if and only ifλ ≥ λ¯. (ii)
The optimal effort levels are derived from the first-order conditions
of the principal’s payoff. 
Lemma 1 (i) shows that if the principal assigns the task to agent
A in both states, then the difference between state-specific effort
levels reduces as the degree of loss aversion increases. Note that
optimal effort levels are given by e1 = α1 and e1 = α2 if agents
are loss neutral; e∗1(w
∗
12) moves downward from α1 and e
∗
2(w
∗
12)
moves upward from α2 as λ increases. Further, if λ is larger than or
equal to λ¯, then e∗1(w
∗
12) coincides with e
∗
2(w
∗
12) at qα1+ (1− q)α2
and hence the agent does not incur any effort-cost uncertainty. In-
tuitively, because each agent dislikes the effort-cost uncertainty at
the first order due to loss aversion, the principal needs to compen-
sate for the expected losses to make the agent accept the contract.
This never happens in the concave-utility case where the princi-
pal specifies different effort levelswhenever productivity levels are
different. If λ is large, the benefit of alleviating expected losses by
specifying the same effort levels exceeds that of improving produc-
tivity by specifying different effort levels. Lemma 1(ii) states that if
the principal chooses a state-dependent task-assignment scheme,
then the effort levels are lower than those in the loss-neutral case.
In this scheme, each agent works in one state but not in the other
state. This uncertainty of the task assignment generates expected
losses in the effort-cost dimension for which the principal must
compensate. Therefore, the principal has an incentive to reduce the
amount of effort in order to decrease expected losses.
We next analyze the optimal contract for loss-averse agents.
By substituting the optimal effort levels into the principal’s profit
function, we have
π(w∗12, e
∗; {1, 2}) =

q
α21
2[1+ (1− q)(λ− 1)]
+ (1− q) α
2
2
2[1− q(λ− 1)] if λ < λ¯,
[qα1 + (1− q)α2]2
2
if λ ≥ λ¯,
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∗; {1}) = q α
2
1
2[1+ (1− q)(λ− 1)]
+ (1− q) 1
2[1+ q(λ− 1)] .
Comparing these profits, we obtain our main proposition:
Proposition 1. Suppose agents are loss averse.
(i) If λ < λ¯, then the contract with the state-independent task
assignment C(w∗12, e∗; {1, 2}) is optimal if and only if α
2
2
1−q(λ−1) ≥
1
1+q(λ−1) . Otherwise, the state-dependent contract C(w
∗
1, e
∗; {1})
is optimal.
(ii) If λ ≥ λ¯, then the state-independent contract C(w∗12, e∗; {1, 2})
is optimal if and only if [qα1 + (1 − q)α2]2 ≥ q α
2
1
1+(1−q)(λ−1) +
(1 − q) 11+q(λ−1) . Otherwise, the state-dependent contract
C(w∗1, e∗; {1}) is optimal.
In contrast to Result 1, a state-independent task assignment can
be optimal: the principal may assign the task to a single agent
in all states. Intuitively, under agent loss aversion the trade-off
between improving productivity and alleviating expected losses
arises, and therefore the state-independent assignment is optimal
if the latter effect outweighs the former. In addition, as described
in Lemma 1, when the degree of loss aversion is large, the optimal
contract becomes state-independent in the sense that it specifies
the same effort levels across states.8 As a comparative statics result,
the state-independent contract is more likely to be adopted as λ
increases because such a contract alleviates the agents’ expected
losses.
Note that the result of state-independent task assignments
(i.e., always employing the same agent) is derived from two
assumptions: that each agent has expectation-based loss aversion
and that each agent’s effort cost is strictly increasing in each
state. On the other hand, the result of state-independent contracts
(i.e., specifying the same effort levels across states) relies on these
two assumptions and an additional assumption that each agent’s
effort-cost function is state-independent. The principal may not
specify the same effort levels across states if the effort cost depends
on the state. Even in this case, however, the principal would assign
the task to a single agent in both states.
8 Note that our result is qualitatively different from that led by cost comple-
mentarity for assignments. Although cost complementarity could explain why the
principal assigns a task to a single agent across states, we predict that the principal
specifies the same effort levels across states when a single agent works on the task
but not when different agents do.4. Concluding remarks
We investigate a task-assignment problem under agent loss
aversion and uncertain future states. We show that state-
independent task assignments become optimal when the positive
effect of alleviating expected losses outweighs the negative ef-
fect of reducing productivity. We also find that the optimal state-
independent contract specifies the same effort levels across states
when the degree of loss aversion is large and the agents’ effort-cost
function is state-independent. This may help explain, for example,
why fixed working-hour contracts are so popular even when em-
ployers can adjust the working hours of their employees contin-
gent on situations. Our results could be also applicable to relevant
issues on labor contracts, such as task specialization versus multi-
tasking, uneven workload, work sharing, and overtime premium.
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